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ABSTRACT 
 
Currently, the grant date fair value of employee stock options is expensed over the vesting period. 
Our study introduces a new valuation approach for stock options and examines the impact of this 
change on earning per share (EPS) for a sample of firms over the period 2002-2011. The new 
valuation approach provides data useful to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as 
it determines whether to revise the current option accounting rules. Under the proposed approach, 
options are valued at their intrinsic value on the grant date (i.e., the opportunity cost or the 
economic promise associated with the difference between the exercise price of the option and the 
market price of the stock at each measurement date) and further revalued each reporting date 
until the options are exercised. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
tock options are considered compensation in nature. Thus, the need to measure their impact (value, 
periodic cost, and expense deduction) on net income is an extremely important issue that the FASB and 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have addressed (Frederickson, Hodge, & Pratt 2006). 
While the accounting standard setting bodies do not primarily concern themselves with tax policy issues, options 
also have economic impact on a firm’s current and potential tax payments and credit rating (Lee 2008). 
 
Applying Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) 123 and FAS 148 (currently ASC Topic 718) and 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 2 can result in different treatments for compensation packages 
that have similar economic consequences (tax, financial, and cash flow) to both the firm and the employee. The 
different treatments diminish the representational faithfulness of the reported amounts. In addition, the models of 
option valuation prescribed by current standards do not readily capture the wealth effects on shareholder value. The 
option amounts are computed at the grant date and then amortized over the vesting period (static measurement and 
amortization of the initial amount over a short period). Future changes in option values over the life of the option (a 
period substantially longer than the vesting period) are ignored. Finally, there are theoretical flaws in stock option 
recognition and measurement approaches required by both the FASB and the IASB (Amile, 2011). 
 
There is a need for a method that reports more reliable and useful information than the current rules 
provide. The tax treatment of options (firms are allowed to deduct the difference between the option price and the 
stock’s market price at the date the employee exercises the option) and the accounting treatment of options under 
current standards are vastly different. The discrepancy was highlighted when the Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations staff asked the IRS to perform analyses to identify the sources of the book-tax differences. The 
staff also asked nine firms to prepare a schedule comparing the option expenses that they would have reported had 
they used FAS 123(R) rules to the tax deductions they took. The reports showed that the book and tax differences 
resulted in tax amounts exceeding 20 billion dollars. 
 
Since valuing and expensing options have been accepted by stakeholders, it is time to take the final step 
and start to continuously value options until they are exercised and capture the true cost of these transactions in 
S 
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company financial statements (McEnroe, Martens, & Du 2013). Delaying this step in the evolution of option 
accounting may provide an opportunity for politicians to dominate the FASB through the SEC, using the gap 
between the reported expenses and the tax deductions taken as an excuse. This study will determine the financial 
consequences of the proposed accounting method by comparing the EPS resulting from the use of the proposed 
model to the amounts currently reported. 
 
PURPOSE 
 
This article aims to present an employee stock option (ESO) accounting model that when compared to the 
current standards of valuing and expensing options: 
 
 better measures the economic value of the promise made to employees, 
 is easy to understand, 
 has a low cost of implementation, 
 eliminates the need for highly controversial rules that presently impact the cash flow statement, 
 offers a superior estimate of the true cash flow effects and economic injury associated with the opportunity 
cost to shareholders of an option exercise, and 
 helps to reduce threats to the legitimacy of the FASB that is unfolding in Congress as the Senate 
investigates the multi-billion dollar gap between what companies report as expense and what they deduct 
on the tax returns. 
 
IMPORTANCE AND USEFULNESS OF THE RESEARCH OUTCOMES: THE ISSUE IN A NUTSHELL 
 
An article by Don Delves (December 2002), reporting on the discussions and conclusions of a panel of 
experts attending a conference addressing stock options, provided the impetus for this study. Some of the most 
influential financial professionals in the world were in the panel, including Robert Hertz, representing the FASB, 
Jim Leisenring, representing the IASB, and Myron Scholes, co-originator of the Black-Scholes option pricing 
model. The number one question that the company directors should ask was: “What is the true total cost of our stock 
option package?” The following quotes, taken from the article (p. 40), described the challenge: 
 
“As mentioned earlier, the stock option expense is just the top of the iceberg. This is particularly true for corporate 
boards that are responsible not only for the long-term success of the company but also for representing and 
safeguarding the interests of the shareholders. This is important because the expense being proposed by the 
accounting profession doesn’t fully capture the ultimate economic cost of stock options to shareholders. The true 
economic cost of an option is the spread between the exercise price and market price on the date the option is 
exercised.” . . . . . “For example, if an option is granted with an exercise price of $10 when the market price is also 
$10, the likely “new accounting” expense will be somewhere between $3 and $5. But if the option is exercised five 
years later when the market price of the stock is $100, then the true total cost of the option is $90.” . . . . . “Someone 
has to be responsible for this $90 cost and for making sure that the company and the shareholders are getting a 
return on this investment. If the company is only taking a $5 expense, then the board must make sure that the rest of 
the cost is tracked and accounted for and that the executives who received this benefit are returning at least that 
much to the shareholders in improved performance.” 
 
Both the FASB and the IASB must abandon the static option valuation and expensing procedures they 
support and adopt a dynamic model of periodic revaluation of options by marking the value of options to the 
economic promise at the financial statement dates. In addition, the market based measurement and recognition of 
option costs must continue after the service period ends (vesting period) and until the options are either exercised or 
expire. The final standards on option accounting must ensure that both the total amount of wealth that has been 
transferred from stockholders to executives and the amount that could be transferred in the future are reported. 
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FLAWS IN CURRENT STANDARDS 
 
Private Firm Reports are Representationally Faithful but Public Firm Reports are Not 
 
While publicly held firms must expense the grant date fair value of the option over the vesting period, 
privately held firms may elect to measure the option at intrinsic value at the grant date and then re-measure the 
intrinsic value at each financial statement date until the options are exercised. This approach creates contributed 
capital amounts that cumulate, with changes in the cumulative amounts recorded as expense at each measurement 
date (decreases in stock prices will result in negative expenses). Under this approach of continuous valuation of 
options, deferred tax assets will be equal to the tax impact of the deduction allowed under the tax code. This is ironic 
because the true cost of options is accounted for by privately held firms, while publicly traded companies use 
measurements that do not reflect true costs. 
 
Option Valuation Models are Flawed 
 
From a financial investment perspective, the true economic cost to a firm of utilizing options as a method 
of compensation is the opportunity cost associated with the difference between the exercise price of the option and 
the market price of the stock upon exercise (i.e. the economic promise). This intrinsic value represents foregone 
capital that could have been raised by the firm if the stock had been issued at current market prices. Therefore, the 
choice of which option valuation model should be used to recognize the option expense should be driven by the 
determination of which model most accurately reflects this loss of shareholder wealth. 
 
Firms measure the effects of options on financial results using matrix, Black-Scholes (BS), or Black-
Scholes-Merton (BSM, for stocks that pay dividends) models for option valuation. The BS model is a closed form 
equation and matrix models are open form equations with probability trees. All models, when supplied with several 
estimated variables, computes a fair option value that includes both intrinsic and time value components. However, a 
number of issues make these models poor choices for option valuation to reflect the ESO expense recognition. First, 
the models were originally developed to value exchange-traded options that have limited lives. Exchange traded 
options also have a liquid secondary market that facilitates low cost transactions, resulting in regular price 
discovery. In contrast, stock options are not transferable. In addition, BS was developed to value a European option 
that cannot be exercised until maturity. Once the vesting period is complete, the ESO can be exercised at the 
discretion of the employee, in effect an American option. Finally, a key input in these models is volatility. Most 
volatility estimates are derived from historical returns, leaving no opportunity for the incorporation of changing 
market conditions and the resulting effects on shareholder wealth (O’Shaughnessy & Rashty, 2007). 
 
Cash Flow Benefits of Excess Tax Deductions Cannot Be Reported in Operating Cash Flows – Reduction in 
Tax Outflows Makes the Reported Amount Unreliable for Financial Analysis 
 
Typically, the deferred tax assets recorded when option expenses are accrued cannot counterbalance the tax 
refund received when the options are exercised, resulting in a credit deficiency in the journal entry. FASB requires 
that the deficiency be credited to contributed capital and a financing cash inflow be reported in the cash flow 
statement for the reduction in taxes in excess of deferred tax assets. This highly controversial approach is consistent 
if one subscribes to the view that issuing options and their tax advantages are primarily a part of the capital raising 
process. Thus, the excess refunds cannot result in reductions in tax expense and cannot be part of the operating cash 
flows. However, it is clear that options are equivalent to salary expenses. Company boards grant options to 
compensate executives and the cash flow to the firm when stocks are issued is a peripheral consideration at best. 
Thus, accounting for the cash flows resulting from options as if they were financing flows is not appropriate (Siegel, 
2006). Indeed, recent research results show that firms increased the use of restricted stock and decreased the use of 
options in compensation packages after the latest accounting standards were issued, but the total cost of 
compensation stayed the same (Carter, Lynch, & Tuna, 2007). 
 
Another Reason to Revise Accounting for Options – The Gathering Storm 
 
According to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, the current state of option accounting 
does not make sense. Tax laws allow companies to take deductions that are 400-1200 times the expenses they report. 
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Options are the only form of compensation and expense whereby companies are allowed to deduct more on their tax 
returns in the aggregate than they are allowed to expense in their books. If the expense amounts reported under FAS 
123(R) over time and in the aggregate faithfully represent the fair values of the options, the tax rules must change to 
allow the tax deduction to occur when the options are granted and match the accounting expense amounts. Stated in 
another way, let two wrongs make a right. To ensure that this proposal to change the tax laws does not occur, the 
accounting rules must change and reflect the economic promise that they do not currently reflect. 
 
METHODOLOGY–COMPUTING THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED MODEL ON EPS 
 
This study examines earnings per share (EPS) under the currently reported system and under the proposed 
economic promise approach. The variable EPS_old is the currently reported earnings per share. EPS_new is the 
earnings per share under the economic promise approach introduced in this study. To measure EPS_new, we first 
calculate the difference between the stock price and the option exercise price at the end of the year. This difference 
is then multiplied by the number of options outstanding in order to compute a new stock option expense. The new 
stock option expense is computed on an after tax basis. For this purpose, we assume an average 30% tax rate for all 
companies in our sample. The new expense is then expressed on a per share basis (based on the number of shares 
used to compute basic EPS). This new stock option expense per share is subtracted from EPS_old while the reported 
stock option expense per share is added back to EPS_old. Overall, this process results in EPS_new which is 
subsequently compared to EPS_old. Note that we do not consider the effects on a multi-period basis as we are solely 
interested in seeing what effects the proposed economic promise approach has on a single-period, as such each fiscal 
year should be interpreted as being independent of the others. 
 
RESULTS 
 
A statistical test of difference in means is performed between EPS_old and EPS_new. Table 1, Panel A 
presents results of the annual comparison tests between EPS_old and EPS_new. The variable |Diff EPS| represents 
the absolute value difference of (EPS_new - EPS_old) and the variable Stat indicates if this difference is statistically 
significantly different from zero. As an example, observe that the difference in EPS in 2002 is 0.34 due to a greater 
EPS_new. This change in EPS arises from a smaller stock options expense under the new approach (as indicated by 
the ‘-’ for the variable New_exp). Further, the evidence shows that this difference in EPS is statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level (as indicated by the ‘***’ for the variable Stat). Results from each independent annual test indicate 
that the differences in means are statistically different from zero for seven out of ten years. This suggests that using 
the economic promise approach can significantly alter the reported earnings for companies that have stock options. 
 
To illustrate how the economic promise approach is more closely tied to stock market conditions, we 
extend the analyses by examining whether stock market pricing trends are in line with the proposed approach. As 
stated above, results for fiscal year 2002 show that EPS_new is significantly higher than EPS_old. This arises from a 
smaller stock options expense under the economic promise approach as compared to the current stock option 
expense. An observation of stock market pricing trends (Table 1, Panel B) reveals that stock prices in general 
decreased during the 2002 fiscal year (based on the results in variables Chg_Price, S&P_500, and DJI). This general 
decrease in stock prices explains the lower stock option expense under the economic promise approach for this fiscal 
year. An examination of the other years in our sample reveals that this logical pattern, where the proposed stock 
options expense trends with general stock prices, repeats for all years with statistically significant differences of the 
variable |Diff_EPS|. The only exception is the fiscal year 2009. For this year, the stock option expense computation 
was lower under current reporting requirements, yet stock prices in general increased. 
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SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
If the intent of the FASB is to force firms to disclose the true economic cost of options to shareholders, then 
a model is needed that will account for changing economic conditions and flexible timing of exercise by option 
holders. Under the economic promise approach, the current calculated amount of the option expense represents the 
opportunity cost the firm has incurred in a given year. This economic cost represents a dynamic estimate of the cost 
to shareholders resulting from the negative opportunity cash flows associated with the option and has several 
advantages over the amount calculated using the BS model. Furthermore, the approach is easy to understand and has 
low implementation cost. Most importantly, it results in an expense amount that represents market conditions when 
financial results are reported. Together with the fact that the model reflects the cash flow effects on shareholder 
wealth associated with options, it should be an attractive alternative to the current option valuation models. 
 
Future research may extend the annual observations to company based observations for each year, where 
the incremental stock option expense for each company for each year is computed and statistically compared to the 
amounts currently reported. This process would require assumptions concerning averages for vesting and exercise 
periods. In addition, the study may be extended to cover industry segments to determine if using the economic 
promise approach leads to statistically significant differences among companies in different industries. 
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Panel A:  Difference in means:
Year
Variable 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
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Panel B:  Capital Market Trends
Year
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  Chg_Price - + + + + - - + + -
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Where:
EPS_new Earnings per share valued under the economic promise approach.
EPS_old Earnings per share as currently reported.
|Diff_EPS| Absolute value difference between eps_new and eps_old.
Stat
New_exp
Chg_Price Sign of the mean change in stock prices for the sample of firms for the fiscal year.
S&P_500 Return on the Standard & Poors 500 stock index for the fiscal year.
DJI Return on the Dow Jones Industrial stock index for the fiscal year.
Table 1
Comparison of EPS based on current system vs. economic promise approach, N=52,141
Statistical significance of difference in means where ***, **, * refers to a p-value of 0.01 and 0.05.
Sign of the difference between the economic promise stock option expense and reported stock option 
expense.
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